The military coup on September 11, 1973, marked a turning point in Chile’s history. The overthrow of Salvador Allende exposed the hidden hand of the United States in Latin American politics and ushered in a brutal dictatorship. This article summarizes declassified documents that reveal how the CIA funded operations to destabilize Allende, followed by communications, interventions, and subsidies to Chilean groups that executed the coup. Let’s follow the facts, document by document, to unravel this plot.

The Beginnings of Covert Intervention (1963–1970)

From the early 1960s, the U.S. viewed Chile as a key Cold War battleground. A 1975 Senate report detailed CIA activities in Chile between 1963 and 1973. The agency spent 3 million (30,878,903 inflation-adjusted USD) in the 1964 presidential elections to secure Eduardo Frei’s victory and block Salvador Allende’s rise. Of this, 5,146,483 (adjusted) funded propaganda via outlets like El Mercurio and Radio Agricultura, while 15,439,451 (adjusted) went to right-wing parties like the National Party and civil groups opposing the Popular Action Front.

In subsequent years, a disinformation network emerged to stoke fear of the “communist threat.” Under CIA Director Richard Helms, agents worked closely with local business leaders like Agustín Edwards, owner of El Mercurio, and organizations like the National Agriculture Society. By 1968, support expanded to conservative unions and student groups, including the University of Chile Student Federation (FEUC), then led by allies of the Christian Democratic Party.

Meanwhile, U.S. corporations like ITT collaborated with the CIA to destabilize governments threatening their interests. At 1969 meetings between ITT executives and CIA agents in Santiago, plans were made to fund strikes and anti-leftist actions.

This mix of direct funding, disinformation, and corporate collusion fueled polarization, laying the groundwork for more aggressive interventions.

Allende’s Election and “Track II” (1970)

When Allende won the September 1970 election, Washington reacted swiftly. Declassified transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s calls show President Nixon ordering measures to block Allende’s inauguration. On September 15, 1970, Nixon, Kissinger, and Helms launched “Track II”—a secret plan to incite a military coup without involving the State Department. The scheme included direct contact with Chilean officers like General Viaux, a key figure in coup attempts.

Transcripts also reveal discussions of $100 million (adjusted) for covert operations, funding propaganda and weapons for military conspirators. Kissinger met with Secretary of State William Rogers, who warned of diplomatic fallout if exposed. Nixon, however, was blunt: “We can’t let Chile go down the drain.”

This campaign included a failed plot to kidnap General René Schneider, a constitutionalist. Though CIA-funded conspirators botched the kidnapping and killed Schneider, the backlash only solidified Allende’s position.

Economic and Political Destabilization (1970–1973)

With Allende in power, the U.S. intensified efforts to cripple Chile. Nixon’s order to “make the economy scream” was executed via strikes, media propaganda, and military contacts.

The CIA funneled $20 million (adjusted) to trucker unions, paralyzing national logistics. Payments for spare parts and fuel ensured strikes continued. The Truckers Association received funds via Chilean business intermediaries tied to the U.S. embassy.

In 1970, the CIA established contact with General Roberto Viaux, known for his coup-friendly stance, to discuss preventing Allende from assuming the presidency. This contact included supplying weapons and funding with the goal of kidnapping General René Schneider, a key defender of Chile’s constitution who opposed military intervention. Though the kidnapping plan was conceived to destabilize the incoming government, it ended in Schneider’s assassination by a group of conspirators. This act, rather than weakening Allende, sparked widespread backlash both domestically and internationally, solidifying his rise to power. The CIA’s involvement in the case was documented in internal records reflecting their financial and logistical support for the groups involved.

The newspaper El Mercurio, led by Agustín Edwards, became a cornerstone of media destabilization against Salvador Allende’s government. Edwards, known for his ties to Washington, traveled to the U.S. in late 1970 to meet with Henry Kissinger and CIA officials. During these meetings, Edwards secured direct financial support from the agency to sustain a relentless disinformation campaign.

With funds channeled through intermediaries, El Mercurio published alarmist headlines and editorials painting a picture of economic and social chaos in Chile. The CIA’s ties to the newspaper deepened in subsequent years, with additional funds approved by the Committee 40, which oversaw covert operations in Latin America.

Approvals included 7,205,077 (adjusted) in 1971 and 7,205,077 (adjusted) in 1971 and 9,932,713 (adjusted) in 1972 to subsidize El Mercurio. The newspaper became central to the anti-Allende narrative, backed by a network of magazines, books, and TV programs spreading disinformation nationally and internationally.

In active collaboration with the CIA, ITT offered an additional $10.2 million (adjusted) to fund anti-Allende activities and even pressured the Nixon administration to intervene directly in Chile. Declassified ITT documents reveal meetings between senior executives and officials like Kissinger, where specific tactics to destabilize the government were discussed.

• Edward Korry: U.S. Ambassador to Chile provided detailed reports on the political situation and facilitated funding coordination with opposition groups.

• Agustín Edwards: Owner of El Mercurio, traveled to the U.S. to meet with senior officials, including Kissinger and CIA members, cementing his role as a key media operative.

• Henry Kissinger: As National Security Advisor, he directly oversaw these strategies, ensuring all actions aligned with U.S. interests.

The Military Coup (September 1973)

Daily reports to President Nixon in the days leading up to the coup demonstrated Washington’s awareness and support. The President’s Daily Brief (PDBs) from September 8, 1973, outlined specific plans by Chilean Navy officers to initiate actions against Allende’s government, backed by key Army and Air Force units. However, it also noted the lack of a fully coordinated strategy.

On September 9, CIA officer Jack Devine sent a CRITIC cable—a highest-priority alert—directly to Nixon and senior officials, warning that the coup would occur on September 11. Such cables were designed to report critical events in real time.

In a post-coup conversation, Nixon asked Kissinger whether “our involvement” was evident in the events. Kissinger replied that “we didn’t do it” directly but acknowledged, “we helped create the conditions as best we could” for its execution.

In August 1973, Committee 40 approved a budget of 10.2 million (adjusted) to support private−sector groups opposing Allende. However, the transfer was delayed due to concerns from Ambassador Nathaniel Davis and the State Department. This funding supplemented the 82 million (adjusted) already spent since 1970 on propaganda, support for opposition parties, and covert operations—including tactical intelligence on facilities to seize and priority arrest lists.

In the months leading up to the coup, the CIA maintained contact with Chilean military officers, including the faction led by Pinochet. They provided tactical intelligence, arrest lists, and data on critical infrastructure. These resources streamlined the execution of the military plan and strengthened coordination among the armed forces. Daily reports to President Nixon in the days before the coup underscored Washington’s awareness and support. The President’s Daily Brief from September 8, 1973, detailed coup plans spearheaded by the Chilean Navy and backed by Army factions. Three days later, the report confirmed the operation was underway and had cross-institutional backing.

Nixon was consistently informed. Geopolitical issues from around the world dominated his PDBs. Declassified reports detail the covert strategies and logistical support Washington provided to the coup plotters to facilitate the September 11 military coup—with Chile being just one of several items on his agenda that day.

The Legacy of the Coup and the Role of DINA (1973–1980s)

Following the coup, the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, DINA) was formally established by Decree 521 in June 1974, though it had operated de facto since November 1973. Declassified documents reveal DINA was designed as an entity outside the control of Chile’s armed forces, reporting directly to Augusto Pinochet. Manuel Contreras, its director, received orders exclusively from Pinochet.

In February 1974, Pinochet personally sought organizational support from Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA. Contreras was invited to Langley (CIA headquarters), where he received training to consolidate DINA into a repressive agency with national and international reach.

DINA spearheaded a multinational collaboration among intelligence forces in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Chile. This network, designed to eliminate political opponents, executed cross-border kidnappings and assassinations. Michael Townley, a key DINA operative, was central to these efforts. He was provided a mansion in Lo Curro, Santiago, which served as his operational base and clandestine laboratory. From there, Townley orchestrated targeted attacks, including the 1974 assassination of General Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires. The same network planned the 1976 car bomb in Washington, D.C., which killed Orlando Letelier and his assistant, Ronni Moffitt. Townley’s role underscores the sophisticated logistics of Pinochet’s international repression apparatus.

The CIA’s intervention in Chile was part of a systematic Cold War policy of hemispheric control. The events in Chile mirror patterns seen in other U.S. interventions in Latin America—Guatemala (1954), the Dominican Republic (1965), and Nicaragua (1980s)—reflecting Washington’s instrumental role in propping up authoritarian regimes aligned with its interests.

Understanding the 1973 coup requires situating it within a geopolitical framework that examines interactions between the Chilean state and foreign capital. This event is not an isolated incident but part of a global pattern of U.S. interventions. Analyzing it fosters media literacy applied to geopolitics, crucial for deciphering contemporary international relations and the external economic interests shaping national policies.